In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach as initiated by Güth and Yaari (1992). It allows to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate...

Adopting the indirect evolutionary approach, we show that it might be beneficial for firms on a heterogeneous market not only to care for their profits but also for their respective customers' welfare.

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach as initiated by Güth and Yaari (1992). It allows to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate...

Adopting the indirect evolutionary approach, we show that it might be beneficial for firms on a heterogeneous market not only to care for their profits but also for their respective customers' welfare. -- evolutionary stability ; customer orientation ; heterogenous market ; duopoly

In this study we propose a formal framework for the indirect evolutionary approach initiated by Guth and Yaari. It allows us to endogenize preferences and to study their evolution. We define two-player indirect evolutionary games with observable types and show how to incorporate symmetric as...