This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and … find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy …

: communication, and punishment (allowing subjects to engage in costly reductions of one another’s earnings after learning of their … contribution decisions). We find that communication increases contributions more than punishment, and, taking into account the cost … of punishment, only communication significantly increases subjects’ earnings and thus efficiency. We study three forms of …

: communication, and punishment (allowing subjects to engage in costly reductions of one another’s earnings after learning of their … contribution decisions). We find that communication increases contributions more than punishment, and, taking into account the cost … of punishment, only communication significantly increases subjects’ earnings and thus efficiency. We study three forms of …

-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases … trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusions of verbal communication generates …

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …