Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at … of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto … compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we …

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at … of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto … compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we …

We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different … bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the … information condition, proposer generosity increases with responder veto power, (b) informed proposers in the ultimatum game try …