We analyze how a contest organizer chooses the winner when the contestants.efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We define the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to...

We examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants´ incomplete information concerning the `type´ of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we...

Cloud computing brings together several existing technologies including service oriented architecture, distributed grid computing, virtualization, and broadband networking to provide software, infrastructure, and platforms as services. Under the old IT model, companies built their own server...

We examine the design of nonlinear prices by a multiproduct monopolist who serves customers with multidimensional but correlated types. We show that the monopoly can exploit the correlations between consumers' types to design pricing mechanisms that fully extract the surplus from each consumer....

The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it...

Since the 1970's most industrialized countries have undertaken massiveinvestment in computers and information technology (IT). Several stylizedfacts emerge from the empirical studies, see Landauer, 1993. In particular,they have found that this investment has not lead to a general increase...

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

In this paper we present a market-based mechanim for allocating public goods which implements the Ratio correspondence in both Nash and Strong Equilibria.