Based on German data between 1999 and 2007, we analyze the growth factors of SMEs andcontrast them with those of large firms. Differences show up both in balance sheet and employmentgrowth. While we conrm earlier results on inherent growth structures and the inuence of firm age,we derive several...

This paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Bothself-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonableexplanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996and December 2006 show that...

This paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing hason a firm’s risk- and information-policy, particularly with respect to credit rene-gotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationshiplending enables firms with high asset specificity...

This paper examines the financing structure of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) inGermany and questions whether an equity gap – or, more generally, a financing gap - exists.Reviewing the literature and available data sources, we find that financing constraints seem toaffect, if at...

Generally, information provision and certi¯cation have been identi¯ed as the majoreconomic functions of rating agencies. This paper analyzes whether the \watchlist"(rating review) instrument has extended the agencies' role towards a monitoringposition, as proposed by Boot, Milbourn, and...

Empirical and experimental papers find that high-powered incentives may reduce performance rather than improve it; a phenomenon referred to as choking under pressure. We show that competition for high ability workers nevertheless leads firms to offer high bonus payments, thereby deliberately...

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogenous firms - characterized by vertical, respectively horizontal,...

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...

Empirical and experimental papers find that high-powered incentives may reduce performance rather than improve it; a phenomenon referred to as "choking under pressure". We show that competition for high ability workers nevertheless leads firms to offer high bonus payments, thereby deliberately...