When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Bannier, Christina E. ; Feess, Eberhard |
Publisher: |
Frankfurt a. M. : Frankfurt School of Finance & Management |
Subject: | Performance-related pay | screening | choking under pressure | competition |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 620692227 [GVK] hdl:10419/30169 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:135 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods |
Source: |
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Bannier, Christina E., (2010)
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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
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