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This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537010
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and … best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756384
This paper describes the “Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting” (BI-SAW) model, which won the http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/Market Entry Prediction Competition in 2010. The BI-SAW model refines the I-SAW Model (Erev et al. [1]) by adding the assumption of limited memory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025196
We submitted three models to the competition which were based on the I-SAW model. The models introduced four new assumptions. In the first model an adjustment process was introduced through which the tendency for exploration was higher at the beginning and decreased over time in the exploration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025198
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312355
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318837
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569667