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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
always true, and many well-known mechanisms are simple, including ascending auctions, posted prices, and serial dictatorship …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584083
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Informational hold up and intermediaries
Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
always true, and many well-known mechanisms are simple, including ascending auctions, posted prices, and serial dictatorship …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588492
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Spectrum Auction Design
Cramton, Peter - 2012
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. The standard …. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach with examples from US spectrum auctions. I then present a …. Experimental tests and early auctions confirm the advantages of the approach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041583
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Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products
Saban, Daniela; Weintraub, Gabriel - 2020
We consider the problem faced by a procurement agency that runs a mechanism for constructing an assortment of differentiated products with posted prices, from which heterogeneous consumers buy their most preferred alternative. Procurement mechanisms used by large organizations, including...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244488
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
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Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig’s greedy heuristic
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2009
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848830
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Auction design for a strategic reserve market for generation adequacy : on the incentives under different auction scoring rules
Brunekreeft, Gert; Meyer, Roland; Rammerstorfer, Margarethe - 2013
How should we select winning bids of generation units for strategic reserves that consist of capacity bids and energy bids? In this paper, we analyze two selecting mechanisms (scoring rules): "simultaneous" and "sequential". In case of a simultaneous scoring rule, capacity and energy bids are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423667
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The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : an experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Mikami, Ryo; Sakai, Toyotaka; … - 2020
We conducted laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice was 20%, whereas the rate increased to 47% among those who received advice. By conducting similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321709
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A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : an experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyataka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; … - 2019
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024698