Similar Search Results

Some excess-based solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility

Vanam, Krishna Chaitanya; Hemachandra, N. - In: International game theory review 15 (2013) 4, pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250241

The nucleolus of large majority games

Kurz, Sascha; Napel, Stefan; Nohn, Andreas - In: Economics letters 123 (2014) 2, pp. 139-143

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399869

Clique games : a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value

Trudeau, Christian; Vidal-Puga, Juan J. - In: Mathematical social sciences 103 (2020), pp. 8-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253669

Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods

Sudhölter, Peter; Zarzuelo, José M. - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 260 (2017) 1, pp. 161-170

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697712

A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration : some comments on the nucleolus of the beer game

Müller, David - In: Journal of industrial engineering and management : JIEM 11 (2018) 3, pp. 528-534

theoretical knowledge we present and compare seven properties of fair profit sharing. Findings: We show that the nucleolus is a … core-solution, which does not fulfil aggregate monotonicity. In contrast the Shapley value is an aggregate monotonic … solution but does not belong to the core of every cooperative game. Moreover, we present the Lorenz dominance as an additional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011921448