Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”), and this ownership structure is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. We posit that common owners want managers to take coordinated anti-competitive actions (i.e.,...

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output....

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous...

Portuguese Abstract: Exploramos vários jogos diferenciais para simular a competição entre duas firmas em Preço, Publicidade, e Preço e Publicidade simultâneamente. Os resultados reforçam conclusões importantes na literatura e complementam-na, permitindo analisar a competição em dois...

This paper provides a full characterization of the price effects of horizontal mergers in the Cournot model with heterogeneous firms and constant returns to scale. We show that the price change brought about by a merger only depends on the smaller merging firm's share and the number of firms,...

Recent supply-chain models that study competition among capacity-constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (that is, to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we...