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coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics …. Contrary to previous experiments, we find that coordination on non-empty Strict Nash equilibria is not an easy task for … significantly helps coordination, but only when subjects are pre-instructed to think of the wheel network as a reasonable way to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062154
We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from … remaining treatments. The paths of play in some groups reveal a tacit dynamic coordination by which groups converge to the … are higher, ceteris paribus, when increasing returns are present. Finally, successful coordination seems to crucially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065547
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674609
coordination device. A player.s informational size associated with the public coordination device is the key to inducing truth … coordination device if she believes that her signal is likely to have a small impact on the public signal generated by the public … equilibrium in nearby private monitoring repeated games when the associated public coordination device, which makes private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120591
In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805575
We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014127568
For repeated games with noisy private monitoring and communication, we examine robustness of perfect public equilibrium/subgame perfect equilibrium when private monitoring is close to some public monitoring. Private monitoring is close. to public monitoring if the private signals can generate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062541
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070123
In an experiment on the repeated prisoner s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083911