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Bisetti, Emilio - 2020

We re-examine the role of managers in preventing free riding when team inputs are not observable. Holmström (1982) shows that managers are necessary due to the team's lack of static incentives to implement budget-breaking group punishments. We ask whether the team can break its own budget in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824227

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2005

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066076

Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs Under Conditional Independence

Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2012

This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110135

Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games : 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups'

Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger D. - 2001

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014127568

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger D. - 2004

A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a dynastic repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable to all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068394

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2005

Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070123

ItS Payback Time : New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma

Bigoni, Maria; Casari, Marco; Salvanti, Andrea; … - 2022

In an experiment on the repeated prisoners dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083911

Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Sugaya, Takuo - 2013

We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093673

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

Bhaskar, V. - 2007

This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729368

Indefinitely Repeated Contests : An Experimental Study

Brookins, Philip - 2020

We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower … this result attenuates with contest experience. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests … compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, and we find empirical support for this. Finally, theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852873

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