evidence on the effects of transparency and empowerment on trust (investment by a principal) and trustworthiness (reciprocal … behavior of an agent) in a simple two-person investment game. We find that when principals are empowered by being able to … punish agents who may not act in a way the principal believes is in the principal’s best interest, trust and investment …

. Empirical evidence, however, is sparse. Using data from an experiment with 359 law and business administration students, we …

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous … maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …

laboratory experiment to study the elements and dynamics of this type of institution. Peer-to-peer reciprocity is important, and … having the ability to practice targeted reciprocity in our experiment increases contributions to the public good by 14 … settings. People thus excluded from the Òcircle of givingÓ provide a clean and strict test of indirect reciprocity, since they …

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous … maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …

report on the results of an experiment designed to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation and …

This article examines an intra- and international trust game experiment among Moroccan, French and Spanish subjects …

an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another …