We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...

We study the development of a duopoly industry -evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior- in a continuous-time real-options model of capacity investment. Our methodology allows the evaluation of investment options and exercise rules in a strategic setup. In the initial industry...

We study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous Bertrand competition in a stochastically growing market. Different patterns of equilibria may arise, depending on the importance of the real option effect. If the average growth rate of the market is close...

This paper is concerned with the incentive properties of the Matthew Effect by which since Merton [1968] one is usually describing the various cumulative advantages that obviously affect academic competition. We introduce a model of sequential contests in which the agents that have initially...

In the 1970s, Thomas C. Schelling proposed a model which claimed to show that a high degree of spatial segregation can result from individual preferences which do not in themselves aim to achieve such a degree of collective segregation. A perverse effect seems therefore to occur. However, the...

Après avoir procédé à l’analyse de la dynamique sociale qui sous-tend l’éradication de l’excision et mutilation génitale féminine (E/MGF) dans cinq pays - l’Égypte, l’Éthiopie, le Kenya, le Sénégal et le Soudan - cet Innocenti Insight se propose de promouvoir...