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Greedy and selfish? Differences in fairness preferences of prospective lawyers and managers

Mertins, Vanessa; Warning, Susanne - In: Zeitschrift fuer Personalforschung. German Journal of … 28 (2014) 4, pp. 410-433

The question of whether lawyers and managers behave selfishly or fairly has inspired discussion for a long time. Empirical evidence, however, is sparse. Using data from an experiment with 359 law and business administration students, we investigate this question empirically and provide first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960450

Greater than the sum of their parts? When combinations of institutions improve citizensâ€™ decisions

Boudreau, Cheryl - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 24 (2012) 1, pp. 90-109

institution is present. The theoretical model demonstrates that a second institution typically should not alter a speakerâ … important departures from such rational behavior. Specifically, a second institution makes subjects more willing to trust the … already mostly truthful statements they receive, which enables them to make better decisions than when only one institution is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009654100

The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for Sustaining Co-operation

Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

and able to implement such punishment institution, how successfully implemented institutions look like, and whether they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137197

The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for Sustaining Co-operation

Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

individuals are willing and able to implement such punishment institution, how successfully implemented institutions look like …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256917

Self-Confidence and Strategic Behavior

Charness, Gary; Rustichini, Aldo; Ven, Jeroen van de - CESifo - 2013

We test experimentally an explanation of over and under confidence as motivated by (perhaps unconscious) strategic concerns, and find compelling evidence supporting this hypothesis in the behavior of participants who send and respond to others’ statements of confidence about how well they have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877986

Do Negative Emotions Explain Punishment in Power-to-Take Game Experiments ?

Galeotti, Fabio - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2015

An important branch of economic research on emotions has used power-to-take game experiments to study the impact of negative emotions, such as anger, irritation and contempt, on the decision to punish. We investigate experimentally the role that the specific punishment technology adopted plays...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251789

The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Instituut - 1999

The power to take game is a simple two player game where players arerandomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder.Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual realeffort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255559

Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction

Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255774

The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

The power to take game is a simple two player game where players are randomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder. Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual real effort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100

Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction

Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137109