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Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 94 (2013) C, pp. 268-277

one of the two states. We elicit subjects’ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to … subject's own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that, when acting as senders, the majority of … receivers cannot be explained by risk preferences or as a best response to subject's own behavior in the sender's role. However …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719252

Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction

Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

We investigated whether 20 emotional states, reported by 170 participants after participating in a Trust game, were experienced in a patterned way predicted by the “Recalibrational Model” or Valence Models. According to the Recalibrational Model, new information about trust-based interaction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817391

Do Liars Believe? Beliefs and Other-Regarding Preferences in Sender-Receiver Games

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

one of the two states. We elicit subjects' beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to … subject's own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive … invest conditional upon a favorable message. The investing behavior of receivers cannot be explained by risk preferences or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817438

The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Irfanoglu, Zeynep B.; Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of the “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e., the winner of the first electoral battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884877

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 224-238

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931195

Commitment problems in conflict resolution

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) C, pp. 33-45

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263909

Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011

equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by randomization …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323518

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2010

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed .We apply two benchmark contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008728040

Side-payments and the costs of conflict

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 278-286

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve a dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666054

Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum

Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Yates, Andrew - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 287-296

We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of the contest ending in two rounds. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666057