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Vote Buying Through Resource Allocation in a Government Controlled Sector
Bennedsen, Morten - In: Rivista di Politica Economica 93 (2003) 1, pp. 49-78
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558962
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POLITICAL OWNERSHIP
Bennedsen, Morten - Økonomisk Institut, Copenhagen Business School - 1999
Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419436
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Political Ownership
Bennedsen, Morten - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 1998
Political involvement in the operation of an enterprises, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. I analyze how the influence externality arising form the interest groups´lobby activities disables the Coase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005225408
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Public Versus Private Ownership under Costly Taxation
Bennedsen, Morten - Centre for Industrial Economics (CIE), Økonomisk Institut - 1998
resources government does not control the firm´s internal resources so any non profit generating activities must be purely tax …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005225413
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The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms
Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper - Økonomisk Institut, Copenhagen Business School - 2002
. of the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, whereas in <p> additional 11-17 pct. of the firms the … controlling owners are likely to incur a control loss. Firms in <p> Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely … to incur a control loss. We continue <p> to estimate the restrictions that the Break-Through rule puts on these firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419423
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Why do firms have boards?
Bennedsen, Morten - Økonomisk Institut, Copenhagen Business School - 2002
. Board frequency increases with more owners, if control is diluted and in larger firms. Given firms have a board, non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419448
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EJERSKABSSTRUKTURER OG KONTROL-ALLOKERING I UNOTEREDE DANSKE VIRKSOMHEDER
Bennedsen, Morten; Nielsen, Kasper - Økonomisk Institut, Copenhagen Business School - 2001
We analyse the relationship between the distribution of ownership and the allocation <p> of control in Danish closely …, boardmembers and CEOs in these firms. Third, we show <p> the presence of control dilution in firms with multiple owners. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419478
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The Principle of Proportionality
Bennedsen, Morten; Meisner; Kasper; Nielsen - Økonomisk Institut, Copenhagen Business School - 2006
proportionality" through proposals that regulate mechanisms opposing a proportional distribution of ownership and control. We … scrutinize the foundation for these initiatives by analyzing the use of instruments to separate ownership from control across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645234
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The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms
Bennedsen, Morten - 2002
the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, whereas in additional 11-17 pct. of the firms the … controlling owners are likely to incur a control loss. Firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely to … incur a control loss. We continue to estimate the restrictions that the Break-Through rule puts on these firms ability to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012740866
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The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe
Bennedsen, Morten - 2006
Previous research initiated by Claessens et al. (2002) has established a value discount of disproportional ownership structures. Due to omitted variables problems it is difficult to provide a causal interpretation of these findings. We provide a thorough analysis of this value discount in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732695