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This paper deals with a privatized firm facing potential market entry. The firm has inherited excess capacity from its public past. The players have asymmetric costs. Only the entrant must install new capacity, which incurs positive capacity installation costs. The paper considers the subgame...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028257
The relationship between risk and asset price fluctuations is studied in a stochastic overlapping generations asset pricing model with i.i.d. production shocks. The non-separability of preferences is an important factor in explaining the time paths of asset prices and returns. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028266
In this paper we characterize the set of Pareto optimal asset equilibria in a stochastic OLG-framework when real monetary shocks impinge on the economy. We show that it is the strength rather than the mere presence of monetary disturbances that accounts for, if the market mechanism fails to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028294
The comment refers to a paper by Grout published in the ECONOMIC JOURNAL (1988). Grout's paper is concerned with the impact of employee shares on the net income of the employees. Analysing a specific game he concludes that "workers in aggregate do not gain from share ownership". This conclusion...
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In a sequential bargaining model of coalition formation and payoff M division players form demands for their participation in a coalition. These M demands have some appealing, intuitive features. We characterize the sets of M semi-stable and stable demands vectors for general NTU games using M...
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In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable and if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028370