The goal of this study is to develop a tool to aid insurance company adjusters in their decision making and to ensure that they are better equipped to fight fraud.

In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts and extended by many...

This article follows a previous study on insurance fraud in the Quebec automobile insurance industry (Dionne and Belhadji, 1996). Results from that research showed that 3 to 6,4% of all claim payments (excluding those for "glass damage only") contained fraud, representing 28 to 61 million...

We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Two of them are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection.

This paper tests the efficiency associated with the role of memory in long-term contracting. Bonus-malus schemes in automobile insurance are examples of contracts that use memory. During the eighties different contributors (Lambert, 1983, Rogerson, 1985, Boyer, and Dionne, 1989) showed how...

We discuss how to detect the informational content of household decisions among the explanatory variables of econometric models. Some applications to the choice of automobile insurance contracts and to the demand for life insurance are provided. We show that the information provided by...

This paper attemps to rationalize the use of insurance covenants in financial contracts, and shows how external financing generates a demand for insurance by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. In our model, the entrepreneur needs external financing for a risky project that can be affected by an...

We discuss how to detect the informational content of household decisions among the explanatory variables of econometric models. Two applications to the choice of automobile insurance contracts and the demand for life insurance are provided. We show that the information provided by additional...