By identifying the possibility of imposing a credible threat of liquidation as the key role of informed (bank) finance in a moral hazard context, and showing how credibility fails when liquidity values are low, this paper identifies the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and...

This paper considers a model of firms' financing based on the existence of a moral hazard problem in the choice of investment projects by a heterogeneous population of entrepreneurs. Two alternative ways of funding these projects, called unmonitored (or market) and monitored (or bank) lending,...

This paper provides a theory of venture capital financing based on the complementarity between the financing and advising roles of venture capitalists. We examine the interaction between the staging of investment, that characterizes young firms with a high growth potential, and the double-sided...

We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their...