This paper compares alternative procedures to mitigate the procyclicality of the new risk-sensitive bank capital regulation (Basel II). We estimate a model of the probabilities of default (PDs) of Spanish firms during the period 1987-2008, and use the estimated PDs to compute the corresponding...

We provide a critical assessment of the countercyclical capital buffer in the new regulatory framework known as Basel III, which is based on the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio with respect to its trend. We argue that a mechanical application of the buffer would tend to reduce capital...

This paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort. Two government agencies with different objectives may perform this function: a central bank and a deposit insurance corporation. Both agencies supervise the bank, i.e. collect...

By identifying the possibility of imposing a credible threat of liquidation as the key role of informed (bank) finance in a moral hazard context, and showing how credibility fails when liquidity values are low, this paper identifies the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and...

This paper considers a model of firms' financing based on the existence of a moral hazard problem in the choice of investment projects by a heterogeneous population of entrepreneurs. Two alternative ways of funding these projects, called unmonitored (or market) and monitored (or bank) lending,...

This paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank by a domestic bank whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter. Each bank is initially supervised by a national agency that cares about closure costs and deposit insurance payouts, and may decide the early closure...