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This paper presents a study on the recently proposed linear inequality representation of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions (ASWFs). We first give an alternative proof of the ASWF integer linear inequality representation theorem, and then show several sufficient conditions on preference domains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257631
The socially optimal allocation has been regarded to be unspecifiable because of utility’s interpersonal incomparability, Arrow’s general possibility theorem, and other factors. This paper examines this problem by focusing not on the social welfare function but instead on the utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259529
This paper examines the socially optimal allocation by focusing not on the social welfare function but instead on the utility possibility frontier in exogenous growth models with a heterogeneous population. A unique balanced growth path was found on which all of the optimality conditions of all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259748
We show that the problem of evaluating infinite sequences (or streams) of utilities by a unique utility (or social welfare function) can be stated in terms of fuzzy subsets of the set of infinite utility sequences. For each stream, its evaluation can be viewed as its degree of membership to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260074
This paper contributes to qualifying the Basu-Mitra approach to the problem of intergenerational social choice, by analyzing the impact of the structure of the feasible set of utilities on Banerjee's (2006) impossibility theorem. We prove that if the utilities that each generation can possess...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113414
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric rules and for the existence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201346
In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous and neutral rules and for the existence of anonymous and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201347