For the case of strict preferences, a measure of a voter’s average power in a dictatorial social welfare function is defined making the dictator never have more average power than three voters and, as the number of voters grows, making the dictator average power converge to the average power...

This paper systematizes the different approaches used to measure health related social preferences. We suggest that those preferences involving both personal and altruistic concerns (the so-called “socially inclusive personal preferences”) should be used to make social decisions. We argue...

This paper concerns ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams. Position i is typically interpreted as the endowment of generation i. We analyze the broad question: In order for the social welfare to increase, the interest of how many generations can be respected if we intend to be...

The majority rule and the hierarchically dictatorial rule are both characterized when preferences are defined over two alternatives. The majority rule is characterized in terms of seven axioms. The hierarchically dictatorial rule is characterized in terms of six of these seven axioms and the...

The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are only two alternatives. The main axioms are motivated by a principle of binary representativeness: the aggregation of the preferences of n voters is the result of splitting the n voters into two...

The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple characterization of the majority rule, for the two-alternative case, that relies on the following property: the choice prescribed by the rule to a group I of individuals must be the one that would...

For two independent principles of intergenerational equity, the implied discount rate equals the growth rate of real per-capital income, say 2%, thus falling right into the range suggested by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. To prove this, we develop a simple tool to evaluate small...

This paper presents a study on the recently proposed linear inequality representation of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions (ASWFs). We first give an alternative proof of the ASWF integer linear inequality representation theorem, and then show several sufficient conditions on preference domains...