We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open...

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish...

Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. In the paper we analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact, and the...

Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbours around a circle eventually coordinated on...

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish...