Patient preferences have a social welfare interpretation consonant with a belief that the society affected by present decisions will last for a very long time. In stochastic settings, these preferences lead to justifications for variants of the precautionary principle.

Abstract. In many economic, political and social situations, circumstances change at random points in time, reacting is costly, and reactions appropri- ate to present circumstances may become inappropriate upon future changes, requiring further costly reaction. Waiting is informative if arrival...

We designed a platform with a betting mechanism for eliciting costly, dispersed information of different quality. Our objective is to elicit both dispersed information and the precision of the information so as to efficiently weight dispersed information to produce reliable forecasts. After...

Contemporary tests for structural change are designed to detect a structural break within a given historical data set of fixed size. Due to the law of the iterated logarithm, these one-shot tests cannot be applied to monitor out-of-sample stability each time new data arrive. The authors propose...

We develop a counterterrorism model to analyze the effects of allowing a government agency to torture suspects when evidence of terrorist involvement is strong. We find that legalizing torture in strong-evidence cases has offsetting effects on agency incentives to counter terrorism by means...

Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. This paper gives a counter-example to the main step in Cotter[modifier letter apostrophe]s [K. Cotter,...

Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. Stinchcombe (2011) [19] proves the existence of correlated equilibria for this class of games. This paper...