We built a simple alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the "pie" they are bargaining over. The unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.

This paper provides strategic foundations for the insight that the bargaining power of employees depends on the firms'labour turnover costs.

Rather than a complete survey, this paper aims at being a tool to help apply game theoretic bergaining models to wage negotiations. In this perspective we review a number of articles which explicitly deal with wage determination as well as purely game theoretical models which we believe can be...

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium.We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized...

Many decision models in marketing science and psychology assume that a consumer chooses by proceeding sequentially through a checklist of desirable properties. These models are contrasted to the utility maximization model of rationality in economics. We show on the contrary that the two...

We develop and study a stochastic eliminative choice procedure, called choice by random checklist (CRC). On the one hand CRC extends the idea of Tversky's Elimination by Aspects (EBA) to explain, for example, stochastically intransitive choices. On the other hand a special case of CRC is...