Fried (in Public Choise, this issue, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2013</CitationRef>) claims that Quesada (in Public Choise 130:395–400, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">2007</CitationRef>) is wrong in showing that the dictator in a dictatorial social welfare function does not necessarily enjoy absolute decision power. This reply revisits, and illustrates by means of an example,...</citationref></citationref>

For the case of two alternatives and a given finite set of at least three individuals, seven axioms are shown to characterize the rules that are either the relative majority rule or the relative majority in which a given individual, the chairman, can always break ties. An axiomatization of the...

If, for strict preferences, a unique choice function (CF) is used to aggregate preferences position-wise then the resulting social welfare function (SWF) is dictatorial. This suggests that the task performed by non-dictatorial SWFs must be “more complex” than just selecting an alternative...

Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are "almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three...

It is shown that no solution concept that selects sequentially rational (perfect, proper, persistent, or members of some stable set of) equilibria satisfies the following consistency property. Suppose that in every solution of the game G, player i's action is a, and denote by Ga the game in...

Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems are proved using a common proof strategy based on a dictatorship result for choice functions. One of the instrumental results obtained shows the inconsistency between the basic assumption in each of these theorems and a mild majority principle.