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On the Incentive Effects of Uncertainty in Monitoring Agents - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov; Uske, … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen … of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric … or symmetric), and piece-rate reward were manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090471
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Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices
Tian, Yisong S. - In: Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 2, pp. 415-432
Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595268
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Why Do Insiders Hedge Their Ownership? An Empirical Examination
Bettis, J. Carr - 2013
We study derivative instruments that corporate insiders use to diversify and hedge their equity ownership. Our evidence suggests that boards might allow use of these instruments in order to mitigate agency costs associated with overvalued equity and high equity-based pay. These instruments are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012710705
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Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - CESifo - 2012
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877789
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Job mission as a substitute for monetary incentives: experimental evidence
Cassar, Lea - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort? I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job charac- teristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that principals can use to influence agents' effort....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941146
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Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255564
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Performance Pay and Multi-dimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences and Gender
Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a first step we elicit subjects’ productivity levels. Subjects then face the choice between a fixed or a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703774
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Marché boursier et gestion de l'emploi : Analyse sur données d'entreprises françaises.
Perraudin, Corinne; Petit, Héloïse; Rebérioux, Antoine - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2007
This article examines the influence of equity capital ownership on human resource management practices. The empirical analysis uses the 2004-2005 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (REPONSE survey), based on a sample of 2,930 establishments with 20 workers or more, representative of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696766
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Exploitation Aversion: When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
Empirical studies of the principal-agent relationship find that extrinsic incentives work in many instances, linking rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal drive to work to master a skill or to improve one's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010680481
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Workers' Participation in Wage Setting and Opportunistic Behavior: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment
Franke, Jörg; Mertins, Vanessa; Gurtoviy, Ruslan - Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in … - 2014
Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified giftexchange game where the degree of workers’ involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775967