Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of … mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which … in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the …

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In …

of tobacco control measures for monitoring and evaluation of process measures achieved on different provisions of Tobacco …

models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the …The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring …

Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external … controls and the severity of punishment.  An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for … corruption, even when citizens' "voice" leads to formal punishment with a relatively low probability.  In contrast, pure top …

.According to the authors of the article, the Composite Technique (Methods) to carry out monitoring of the implementation of the AE … towards assessing the extent of influence of the AE NLAP on corruption risks of the legal regulations, on corruption practices … public administration of counteracting corruption in public authorities and local government. …

coefficients. Our paper contributes to the (small) literature on experimental tests of (anti-)corruption measures and adds evidence …

corruption in professional sumo. In the present paper, we update Duggan and Levitt's study to take into account changes since … January 2000. We find strong statistical evidence that corruption is reduced after January 2000 but reappears in the period …