This paper considers the problem of optimal unemployment insurance in a moral hazard framework. Unlike existing literature, unemployed workers can secretly participate in a hidden labor market; as a consequence, an endogenous lower bound for promised utility preventing "immiserization" arises....

When consumers can’t pay their credit card bills, they choose between delinquency and bankruptcy. A new economic model indicates that by changing the face value of delinquent debt, lenders can maximize repayment and make a difference in whether or not a household chooses bankruptcy.

A delinquency rate of 15 percent for all student loan borrowers implies a delinquency rate of 27.3 percent for borrowers with loans in repayment.

We incorporate house price risk and mortgages into a standard incomplete market (SIM) model. We calibrate the model to match U.S. data, and we show that the model also accounts for non-targeted features of the data such as the distribution of down payments, the life-cycle prole of homeownership,...

We first study growth and risk sharing in a stochastic growth model with preference shocks and two risk-averse agents. In periods in which one of the agents needs extra consumption (insurance), it is socially optimal to reduce the consumption of the other agent (redistribution) and also to...

While households decreased credit card debt between 2007 and 2010, the process varied by education level between the extensive margin (how many households borrowed) and the intensive margin (how much households borrowed).

How important is financial development for economic development? A costly state verification model of financial intermediation is presented to address this question. The model is calibrated to match facts about the U.S. economy, such as intermediation spreads and the firm-size distribution for...