Showing 1 - 10 of 211
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have proposed a theory of equilibrium selection that selects a unique Nash equilibrium for any non-cooperative N-person game. The heart of their theory is given by the tracing procedure, a mathematical construction that adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs into equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090834
The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371106
This paper presents an experimental investigation of how a systematic variation in the cognitive demands on subjects affects the optimal play. The innovation of this paper is the choice of a game, which we call the Game of Position. This is a two-player zero-sum game characterized by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434799
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005391095
We investigate how moral concerns about permit trading affect an endogenous pollution permit trading equilibrium, where governments choose non-cooperatively the amount of permits they allocate to domestic industries. Politicians may feel reluctant to allow permit trading and/or may prefer that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004967607
This book summarizes ongoing research introducing probability space isomorphic mappings into the strategy spaces of game theory. This approach is motivated by discrepancies between probability theory and game theory when applied to the same strategic situation. In particular, probability theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108453
In this chapter we give an overview on the theory of noncooperative games. In the first part we consider in detail for zero-sum (and constant-sum) noncooperative games under which necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff function and different (extended) strategy sets for both players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731012
In this paper we propose a new method to evaluate the distribution of power between decision-making bodies in the European Union. Conventional methods that measure the voting power of players, such as the Banzhaf, Johnston, Holler and Shapley-Shubik indices, are insufficient for this purpose....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777774
This paper proposes an answer to the question: `What constitutes an adequate explanation to any generic institution?' I argue that if we adhere to a `rational choice' approach to the study of institutions, to explain an institution we must identify a set of actors, able to impose their will on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777965
The paper purports to stress how the two major contributions of Bacharach: "Variable Frame Theory" (VFT) and "Team Reasoning" (TR) improve Standard Non-Cooperative Game Theory in some relevant aspects which I point out. The aims are to show: (i) how Bacharach respectively justifies coordination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860426