Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Finus, Michael ; Ierland, Ekko ; Dellink, Rob |
Published in: |
Economics of Governance. - Springer. - Vol. 7.2006, 3, p. 271-291
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | International environmental agreements | Kyoto-Protocol | Cartel formation | Stability of coalitions | Non-cooperative game theory |
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