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We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005396430
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007718609
We construct a model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow values while searching. Agents enter the market relaxed (with high flow values) but move to a desperate state (low flow values) at a Poisson rate if they have not already transacted. We characterize the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005400826
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942387
We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169600
In many economies, there is substantial economic activity in the informal labor market, beyond the reach of government policy. Labor market policies, which by definition apply only to the formal-sector can have important spillover effects on the informal sector. The relative sizes of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184830
We give an expression for the expected number of matches between unemployed workers and vacancies when each worker makes a = 2 applications, correcting Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2003). We also show that the limiting matching probability given in our earlier note is correct for any finite a.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622952
We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233765
Not all meetings, however, necessarily lead to transactions. A match occurs if and only if the sale results in a positive surplus; otherwise, the potential buyer and seller continue to search. The continuation flow values that the prospective buyer and seller bring to the table as well as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010554401
This result would seem to imply that the more members on a committee the lower the average search duration. It turns out that this does not immediately follow, and in fact, the average search duration may increase as the committee grows in size. Thus, we cannot simply compare thresholds to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010554644