Predictions concerning structure and performance for managerial incentive contracts designed to prevent accidents are developed and tested. The model predicts a step-function penalty with more costly, more reliable audits used for higher loss reports to control ex post exaggeration of the loss....

The configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium-deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system. Using contractual data from a representative insurer, the authors estimate a reduced-form...

Predictions concerning structure and performance for managerial contracts designed to prevent accidents are developed and tested. The model predicts a step-function penalty with more costly, more reliable audits used for higher loss reports to control ex post exaggeration of the loss. In...

In this article, the effects of fee-for-service personal financial planning on the decision making of a profit-maximizing life insurance general agent are examined. Three refutable propositions are developed which implicate the movements of the general agent who must adjust to a new optimal...