Optimal Incentive Contracting with Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazards: Theory and Evidence
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Puelz, Robert ; Snow, Arthur |
Published in: |
Journal of risk and uncertainty : JRU. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 0895-5646, ZDB-ID 598379. - Vol. 14.1997, 2, p. 169-188
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