Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

In the paper, we study a relation between command games proposed by Hu and Shapley and an influence model. We show that our framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. We define several influence functions which capture the command structure. These functions...

A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a...

An exercise in the empirical use of voting power indices from cooperative game theory applied to ownership data for large companies, this paper contributes in two areas : (1) the analysis of company control based on shareholder voting power, and (2) the empirical use of power indices and...

In the paper, we study a relation between command games proposed by Hu and Shapley and an influence model. We show that our framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. We define several influence functions which capture the command structure. These functions...

In the paper, we study a relation between command games proposed by Hu and Shapley and an influence model. We show that our framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. We define several influence functions which capture the command structure. These functions...

In the paper, we study a relation between command games proposed by Hu and Shapley and an influence model. We show that our framework of influence is more general than the framework of the command games. We define several influence functions which capture the command structure. These functions...

We prove that for the proportional representative election system if parties’ sizes are uniformly distributed on the simplex, the expected ratio of a party size to its political power, measured by the Shapley–Shubik index, converges to <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$1$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, as the number <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>n</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of parties...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here we...

This paper applies a measure of relative voting power to the weighted voting system of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). Almost all assessments of internal governance of the IADB and other international financial institutions make reference to members' votes as a proxy for relative...