Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Year of publication: |
2014-11
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kóczy, László Á. |
Institutions: | Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont |
Subject: | quarrelling | rejected coalitions | a priori voting power | power indices | minimal winning coalitions | rational players |
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