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A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008855232
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543763
This contribution revisits the problem of allocating R&D subsidies by government agencies. Typically, the applicants … procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729634
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and … performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785851
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556728
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010871223
We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who wants to select an optimal subset of projects to maximize her … faces hard ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constraint must hold for each possible outcome while the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161439
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010668400
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. ¡°Steeper¡± securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010705928
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer¡¯s type, which drives a unique separating and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010705929