Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jun, Byoung Heon ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. |
Institutions: | Institute of Economic Research, Korea University |
Subject: | Auctions | mechanism design |
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