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We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n  w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the...
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The top-two primary is the new primary system passed in several states of the US that creates a single ballot in which the top two vote getters pass to the general election. Primary elections induce a sequential game with three stages: the candidate-entry stage, the primary election stage, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103260
A jury has to choose the winner of a contest. There exists a deserving winner, whose identity is common knowledge among the jurors, but not known by the planner. Jurors may be biased in favor (friend) or against (enemy) some contestants. We study conditions on the confi?guration of the jury so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103261
In this article, a two-party contest where candidates allocate their campaign resources strategically between two salient issues is studied. The analysis aims to determine the circumstances under which there is issue convergence (both parties emphasizing the same issue) or issue divergence...
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A jury has to decide the winner of a competition among a group of contestants. All members of the jury know who the deserving winner is, but this contestant is unknown to the planner. The social optimum is that the jury select the deserving winner. Each individual juror may be biased in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276114
A jury must provide a ranking of contestants (students applying for scholarships or Ph.D. programs, gymnasts in a competition, etc.). There exists a true ranking which is common knowledge among the jurors, but is not verifiable. The socially optimal rule is that the contestants be ranked...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005005920
We consider the problem of allocating m commodities among n agents with single-peaked preferences. When m\geq2 and n=2 any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. We propose an extension of the Uniform Rule that (in the two-agents case) is the only one that satisfies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752899
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