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Dynamic Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Multi-Stage Promotion Contests
Stracke, Rudi; Sunde, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
compensated by positive continuation-value and selection effects. Due to these positive dynamic incentive effects of heterogeneity …This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests … with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886143
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Incentives and selection in promotion contests: Is it possible to kill two birds with one stone?
Stracke, Rudi; Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; … - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für … - 2014
This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010754256
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How creative are you? An experimental study on self-selection in a competitive incentive scheme for creative performance
Bradler, Christiane - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2015
. The existing evidence on the self-selection of agents is largely limited to job tasks where performance is driven by … productivity, but only according to their risk attitudes and self-assessments. The reason for the absence of a selection of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213916
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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006
is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086299
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The Peter Principle: An Experiment
Dickinson, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007
The Peter Principle states that, after a promotion, the observed output of promoted employees tends to fall. Lazear (2004) models this principle as resulting from a regression to the mean of the transitory component of ability. Our experiment reproduces this model in the laboratory by means of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112717
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2004
the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are so far thin on the ground. In addition, these effects may be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005112731
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Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822207
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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763542
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are so far thin on the ground. In addition, these effects may be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763609
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Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
Bandiera, Orana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - The Field Experiments Website - 2006
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785137