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Goberna, Miguel A.; Vera de Serio, Virginia N. - In: Journal of global optimization : an international … 41 (2008) 4, pp. 613-624

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008071468

Wealth effects and agency costs

Chade, Hector; Vera de Serio, Virginia N. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 1-11

We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785193

On the stability of linear systems with an exact constraint set

Amaya, Jorge; Goberna, Miguel A. - In: Mathematical methods of operations research 63 (2006) 1, pp. 107-122

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006604819

Analyzing linear systems containing strict inequalities via evenly convex hulls

Goberna, Miguel A.; Rodr#305#769guez, Margarita M.L. - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 169 (2006) 3, pp. 1079-1095

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006641098

Penalty and Smoothing Methods for Convex Semi-Infinite Programming

Auslender, Alfred; Goberna, Miguel A.; López, Marco A. - In: Mathematics of operations research 34 (2009) 2, pp. 303-319

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008255210

Simplex-Like Trajectories on Quasi-Polyhedral Sets

Anderson, Edward J.; Goberna, Miguel A.; Lopez, Marco A. - In: Mathematics of operations research 26 (2001) 1, pp. 147-162

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006418945

Analyzing linear systems containing strict inequalities via evenly convex hulls

Goberna, Miguel A.; Rodri'guez, Margarita M.L. - In: European Journal of Operational Research 169 (2006) 3, pp. 1079-1095

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005283387

Risk aversion, moral hazard, and the principal's loss

Chade, Hector; Serio, Virginia N. Vera de - In: Economic Theory 20 (2002) 3, pp. 637-644

In their seminal paper on the principal-agent model with moral hazard, Grossman and Hart (1983) show that if the agent's utility function is $U(I,a)=-e^{-k(I-a)}$, then the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's action is increasing in the agent's degree of absolute risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596812