) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test … two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect … punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding …

controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does … not benefit from contributions to the public good. Punishment is costly. Along with the punishment decisions the authority … writes justifications for her decisions. In the Baseline, authorities are requested to justify punishment decisions, but the …

Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I test the … against advantageous inequity. Using a linear public good with centralized punishment, I find that participants increase … against exploiting others, the less it matters whether punishment was deterrent. …

symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing … corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same … design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially …

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups … of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the MPCR … punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. This reflects increased per-capita expenditures on punishment that offset …

Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public …-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoffs below the non-cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In … fall prey to a poverty trap or, to avoid this, abstain from punishment altogether. We show that neither is the case …

We use a laboratory experiment to test the impacts of uncertainty, the magnitude of fines and aversion against making …