A framework is proposed to subsume public goods and common-pool resources, respectively, as specific cases of positive and negative externalities. A pure public good is a positive externality whose appropriable benefits are too small or too uncertain relative to the high private cost for anyone...

The goal of this paper is to develop the theoretical framework of the public goods provision. This theoretic contribution is based on the critical analysis of mainstream economics theories dealing with public goods as market failure (neoclassical economics and neoliberalism) and on the results...

This paper is a first step toward closing the analytical gap in the extensive literature on the results of interactions between public and private R&D expenditures, and their joint effects on the economy. A survey focusing on econometric studies in this area reveals a plethora of sometimes...

The paper studies the role of income taxes and admission fees in financing excludable and nonexcludable public goods in a large economy. A renegotiation proofness condition makes the multidimensional Bayesian mechanism design problem tractable. Resulting formulae for optimal income taxes and...

Software is a potentially excludable public good. It is possible, at some cost, to exclude non-paying users from its consumption by using copyright law or technological restraints. Licensing the software under proprietary license terms makes of it a private good, licensing it under the BSD does...

We consider an environment with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good and a private good. If the public good must be financed from contributions made by participants and if participants must be given incentives to participate in the mechanism, we show that there are...

We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. The efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its...

This paper gives an explanation why government and large contributors aoften make contributions to a a charity in-kind rather in cash. We consider a charity that produces a public good a strictly concex production technology and with more than one factor of production.

This paper is a first step toward closing the analytical gap in the extensive literature on the results of interactions between public and private R&D expenditures, and their joint effects on the economy. A survey focusing on econometric studies in this area reveals a plethora of sometimes...