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Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment
Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the … explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming … the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667907
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Social preferences can make imperfect sanctions work: Evidence from a public good experiment
Engel, Christoph - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) C, pp. 343-353
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I test the hypothesis that imperfect sanctions may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using a linear public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116856
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Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667903
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Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game Does Not Reflect Selfish Preferences
Staffiero, Gianandrea; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Espín, … - Murat Sertel İleri İktisadi Araştırmalar Merkezi, … - 2012
The rejection of unfair proposals in ultimatum games is often quoted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. In this paper we focus on those responders who accept any proposals, setting the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) at zero. While this behavior could result from the randomization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990739
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Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences
Staffiero, Gianandrea; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Espín, … - In: Economics Letters 121 (2013) 2, pp. 236-238
We show that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer to zero in an ultimatum game are the most generous players in a dictator game. This finding challenges the interpretation of the acceptance of low offers as payoff-maximizing behavior.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041817
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Are teams less inequality averse than individuals ?
He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014
-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858037
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Are Teams Less Inequality Averse than Individuals?
He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884177
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Does Payoff Equity Facilitate Coordination? A test of Schelling's Conjecture
Lopez-Perez, Raul; Pinter, Agnes; Kiss, Hubert Janos - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2013
Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria ?the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743468
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Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics
Dreber, Anna; Fudenberg, Drew; Rand, David G. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 98 (2014) C, pp. 41-55
We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy version of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that DG giving is correlated with cooperation in the repeated game when no cooperative equilibria exist, but not when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743942
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Income effect and altruism
Chowdhury, Subhashish Modak; Jeon, Joo Young - School of Economics, University of East Anglia - 2012
We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. Inequity aversion theories predict either no effect or a decrease in giving, whereas warm-glow theory predicts an increase in giving with an increase in the common income of donor and receiver....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010579190