We develop a model of deliberation under heterogeneous beliefs and incomplete information, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the consequences of social integration. We show that when priors are correlated, all private information is...

I consider a final-offer arbitration model in which the offers are submitted sequentially, the parties are allowed to accept offers, and the arbitrator maximizes Nash's social welfare function. I show that backwards induction in this three-period model leads to the subgame-perfect equilibrium...

We consider a general class of games that have been used to model many economic problems where players' sentiments are believed to play an important role. Dropping the common prior assumption, we identify the relevant notion of sentiments for strategic behavior in these games. This notion is...

We analyze "nice" games (where action spaces are compact intervals, utilities continuous and strictly concave in own action), which are used frequently in classical economic models. Without making any "richness" assumption, we characterize the sensitivity of any given Bayesian Nash equilibrium...

This paper develops and tests a model of how recall of information from past decisions affects subsequent related decisions. A boundedly rational individual has to determine her willingness to pay for a good that she previously considered purchasing at a given price, or provide valuations for a...

In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about...

Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given the payoff-relevant parameters, existing results conclude that as individuals observe infinitely many signals, their beliefs about the parameters will eventually merge. We first show that these results are...

Excessive optimism is a prominent explanation for bargaining delays. Recent results demonstrate that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining, and its careful analysis may shed valuable insights into negotiation behavior. This article reviews some of these results, focusing on the following...

We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action a_i is played by a type t_i in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of t_i for which a_i is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is...