Showing 1 - 10 of 25
We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that species setup, reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent connectedness is introduced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745507
We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010616272
The robustness of Aumann’s seminal agreement theorem with respect to the common prior assumption is considered. More precisely, we show by means of an example that two Bayesian agents with almost identical prior beliefs can agree to completely disagree on their posterior beliefs. Besides, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682572
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010148635
I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate to the number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agree to participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeated announcements of the number of the participants leads the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423919
In this article we discuss the differences between the average marginal effect and the marginal effect of the average individual in sample selection models, estimated by the Heckman procedure. We show that the bias that emerges as a consequence of interchanging the measures, could be very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463339
In a novel experimental design we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies. More precisely, each agent's income at the end of a period serves as her endowment in the following period. In this setting growth and inequality arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123430
In this paper, we introduce a notion of epistemic equivalence between hierarchies of conditional beliefs and hierarchies of lexicographic beliefs, thus extending the standard equivalence results of Halpern (2010) and Brandenburger et al. (2007) to an interactive setting, and we show that there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785196
We consider agents who attach a rational probability to every Borel event. We call these Borel probability measures rational and introduce the notion of a rational belief hierarchy, where the first order beliefs are described by a rational measure over the fundamental space of uncertainty, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786720
The present paper extends the standard model of pairwise communication among Bayesian agents to cases where the structure of the communication protocol is not commonly known. We show that, even under standard strict conditions on the structure of the protocols and the nature of the transmitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010875250