This paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the...

School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park Campus and Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University

Prices and quantities converge to the theoretical competitive equilibria in continuous, double auction markets. The double auction is not a tatonnement mechanism. Disequilibrium trades take place. The absence of any influence of disequilibrium trades, which have the capacity to change the...

We introduce a simple, easy to implement instrument for jointly eliciting risk and ambiguity attitudes. Using this instrument, we structurally estimate a two-parameter model of preferences. Our findings indicate that ambiguity aversion is significantly overstated when risk neutrality is assumed....

This paper tests the robustness of the "two-tiered market" in which efficient bilateral contracts emerge between firms and workers (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). Our experiment introduces stochastic interruptions in firms' ability to offer contracts. Involuntarily laid off workers are eager to be...

Industrial clusters and factory industries co-develop during industrialization and the relational contracts between manufacturers and subcontractors are the organizational basis of clusters. We predict that relational transactions between manufacturers and subcontractors and cooperative action...