This book has three main objectives: (a) to discuss the main implications that consumers' inability to make rational choices can have on the functioning of second pillars, (b) to describe how jurisdictions have tried to address these problems through ad hoc policy interventions, and (c) to...

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...

The development of the market of a product needs a wide knowledge of consumption and marketing practices relevant. This paper issue is to analyze the cashew nuts commercialization system in Bantè and Savalou regions in order to identify strengths and weaknesses relevant to the cashew nuts chain...

The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation...

A two-part tariff is a pricing scheme according to which the buyer pays to the seller a fixed fee and a constant charge for each unit purchased. When it is used, the average price paid decreases as more units are purchased. Further, it is the marginal charge and not the fixed fee that determines...

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...

In standard Bertrand model duopolists compete on perfect markets. However, not many markets are perfect. In fact most of the markets have certainstructure, and this structure is known to producers. We describe the marketorganization by modeling consumer-producer networks and demonstrate thatif...