stability. Nevertheless, an embedding into a one-to-one agent--slot matching market shows that stable outcomes exist and can be …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in this …

Roth is the major force in creating a vibrant field of matching theory and its application to market design. In doing … so, he has discovered many properties of the stable matching problem (especially from the strategic viewpoint of game …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982 …

We develop a model in which firms set their salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any … recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results …