WinBUGS is a program for Bayesian model fitting by Gibbs sampling. WinBUGS has limited facilities for data handling, whereas Stata has no routines for Bayesian analysis; therefore, much can be gained by running Stata and WinBUGS together. We present a set of ado-files that enable data to be...

This study develops a free-entry model of competition between media firms, characterizes its equilibrium, and establishes that the industry displays a natural tendency to concentrate. A merger of any 2 firms is strictly profit increasing. Therefore, incentives to consolidate, while maintaining...

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for...

I study a simple model of moral hazard with soft information. The risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments, the principal cannot solve these two problems...

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for...

We study pricing by a two-sided platform when it faces moral hazard on the sellers? side. In doing so, we introduce an equilibrium notion of platform reputation in an infinite horizon model. We find that with transaction fees only, the platform cannot eliminate the loss of reputation induced by...

We study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. High-power contracts may not be appropriate when information is soft. The optimal...

type="main" <p>We study pricing by a two-sided platform when it faces moral hazard on the sellers' side. In doing so, we introduce an equilibrium notion of platform reputation in an infinite horizon model. We find that with transaction fees only, the platform cannot eliminate the loss of reputation...</p>

The theory of acceptance sets and their associated risk measures plays a key role in the design of capital adequacy tests. The objective of this paper is to investigate, in the context of bounded financial positions, the class of surplus-invariant acceptance sets. These are characterized by the...