Scale effects in dynamic contracting
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bromberg-Silverstein, Shirley ; Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago ; Roger, Guillaume |
Published in: |
Mathematics and financial economics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1862-9660, ZDB-ID 2389109-9. - Vol. 15.2021, 2, p. 431-472
|
Subject: | Downsizing | Dynamic contracts | Moral hazard | Risk taking | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Skalenertrag | Returns to scale | Personalabbau | Downsizing (Staff) | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract |
-
Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
Barbos, Andrei, (2019)
-
Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
Antinolfi, Gaetano, (2015)
-
Endogenous agency problems and the dynamics of rents
Biais, Bruno, (2020)
- More ...
-
Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago, (2015)
-
Scale Effects in Dynamic Contracting
Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago, (2017)
-
Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago, (2016)
- More ...